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COMMENT
EXCLUSIONARY LAND-USE TECHNIQUES:
JUDICIAL RESPONSE AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of recent state court cases dealing directly with
local land-use regulations which discriminate against low-income groups
or racial and ethnic minorities. The fourteenth amendment, the Civil
Rights Acts and the Fair Housing Act are being used by courts in their
efforts to infuse land-use regulations with the Constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and due process of law. The decisions are invalidating
practices which are promulgated for or result in discrimination; for ex-
ample, refusing to grant building permits based on restrictive building
codes, proposing referendums on zoning ordinances which allow low-in-
come housing, and resegregating public housing through site selection.
Legislation designed to eliminate the exclusionary effect local land-use
regulations have on low-income housing has been passed by a few states
and is currently pending before the General Assembly of Illinois and the
Congress of the United States.' This legislation, to be discussed later, is
broad in its scope. In addition to bills amending the present municipal
zoning codes, there are bills setting up regional coordination of land use to
supersede local control. National land-use policies are being established
to encourage and assist the states in regional land-use planning and de-
velopment. The central purpose of this legislation is to preempt local ordi-
nances which have, among other things, effectively excluded low-income,
federally-assisted housing from the suburban areas. Through racial and
economic discrimination, local regulatory ordinances have maintained seg-
regated communities in spite of national non-discriminatory policies.
This comment will analyze local zoning ordinances and their effect on
low-income minorities' need for housing in the suburbs. The analysis
will show how the related devices of building codes, site selection, and
public referendums supplement the zoning ordinance to frustrate at-
1. Inf ra notes 81-97.
tempts at locating low-income housing outside racially concentrated areas.
Court decisions founded in due process and equal protection are calling
for affirmative action by communities to include low-income housing
within their borders.2  State and federal legislation, through regional
planning and control, are seeking to end exclusionary zoning practices and
insure decent low-income housing in suburban communities. Unless com-
munities begin to permit low-income minority housing in their area, the
state and federal governments will control the land-use planning and de-
velopment from a regional basis. The principle underlying this legislative
and judicial action is that housing is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the United States Constitution.
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The methods used to achieve racial discrimination have become in-
creasingly subtle since the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act
have declared racial discrimination in public housing illegal.3 Through
the use of zoning ordinances, local authorities effectively exclude minority
groups both racially and economically.4  The ironic aspect of discrimina-
tory zoning is that comprehensive zoning as a land-use control has been
2. In National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Twp. Board of Adjust-
ment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the Pennsylvania court, using due process
as the basis for striking down an exclusionary zoning scheme, said: "The ques-
lion posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the national forces
which send our growing population into hitherto underdeveloped areas in search
of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid
future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon the administration of public services
and facilities, cannot be held valid." Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. See Appeal of
Groff, 274 A.2d 574 (1971) in which the court held that a municipality cannot
zone out population (mobile home expansion) because of problems resulting from
its increase.
The recent Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) held a
zoning ordinance unconstitutional when, though not expressly prohibiting apart-
ments. it made no provision for them. The state court felt that no local governing
unit can retreat behind a wall of exclusionary zoning whether this zoning actively
excludes apartments or passively omits including them. See Washburn, Apartments
in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970); Note,
24 S.W.L.J. 838 (1970).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000d (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 3601 (1970).
4. See Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 642 (1966); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protec-
tion, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Comment, Land Use Control
in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 335 (1972); Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection,
84 H v. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Low-Income Housing in the Suburbs: The
Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 58 (1971).
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held constitutional by the courts since 1926. 5
A recent situation typified the problems low-income familes have ob-
taining public housing in the suburban area.0 Black Jack, Missouri, is
a small, unincorporated community about 15 miles south of St. Louis.
Ranch and split-level homes make up the residences and are $30,000 to
$35,000 in value. A St. Louis based social action group, called the Inter-
religious Center for Urban Affairs, Inc., purchased 11.9 acres of land in
1969 for construction of low-income housing units in the Black Jack com-
munity. The development was to be financed through FHA-insured loans
and known as Park View Heights. Local county and town citizens op-
posed the development in fear of over-crowded schools and anxiety about
increases in the crime rate. The Black Jack Improvement Association
was formed to warn the citizens of the imminent dangers and Black Jack
was incorporated. Soon thereafter, the local zoning ordinance was re-
vised. Local land, formerly zoned for multiple dwellings, was rezoned
to permit only single-family dwellings. The Center's housing director said,
"All the questions were tainted by racial considerations. ' 7 George Rom-
ney of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
called the zoning ordinance a "blatant violation of the Constitution and
the law." 8
Zoning, by definition, means to exclude certain uses of land ', for the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 10 The power to zone
5. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also
Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 199 (1955), dealing with the Supreme Court's refusal to hear zoning cases.
Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970). See gener-
ally, R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING / 2.10 (1968); J. MATZENBAUM,
THE LAW OF ZONING (2nd ed. 1955).
E. BASSETT, ZONING § 133 (1940) includes a discussion of the first comprehensive
zoning ordinance and the case upholding its validity, Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams
Bldg. Corp., 299 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920), which upholds comprehensive
zoning in New York and was the basis for later enabling acts.
6. Fixing the Odds in Black Jack, TIME, April 26, 1971, at 19. See Comment,
Exclusionary Zoning and the Problem in Black Jack-A Denial of Housing to
Whom? 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 294 (1971) discussion of Park View Heights Corp. v.
Black Jack, 335 F. Supp. 899 (1971).
7. TIME, April 26, 1971, at 19.
8. Id. at 20.
9. See Siegan, Exclusion Is the Name of the Game, Chicago Tribune, July 11,
1971, at 3, sec. ]a, col. 1. For cases upholding the power to divide a city into
specific areas for desegregated uses, see Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.
477, 234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479 (1925); Mansfield and Sweet, Inc. v. West
Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment,
414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
10. See Kirsh Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 111 N.J. Super. 359, 268
[Vol. XXII390
.1972] COMMENT 391
is not absolute, but must be exercised, subject to the specific state enabling
statutes and the state and federal constitutions, in a non-discriminatory
manner." The likelihood of zoning ordinances being used in such a man-
ner was discarded by Judge Westenhaver 47 years ago when he said:
The plain truth is that the true object of the [zoning] ordinance in question is to
place all the property ... in a straitjacket. The purpose to be accomplished is
really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In
the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and seg-
regate them according to their income or situation in life. The true reason why
some persons live in a mansion and others in a shack ...is primarily economic. 12
An interesting characteristic of exclusionary zoning ordinances is their
subtlety. On their face they seem reasonable enough, but a closer ex-
amination will reveal the insidious scheme to prevent low-income housing
from entering the community, restrict the area to a specific income level,
and deny a growing population a place to live and work.
The zoning ordinance effectuates discrimination in a variety of ways."
Lot size requirements can raise the cost of land and make it impossible
for even a moderate-income family to live in the area. 14  Restrictions as
A.2d 333 (1970); Mid-West Emery Freight System, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 120
I11. App. 2d 425, 257 N.E.2d 127 (1970); New York Institute of Technology, Inc.
v. Ruchgaber, 317 N.Y.S.2d 89, 65 Misc. 2d 241 (1970).
11. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1970); Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970); High Meadows Park, Inc. v. City of
Aurora, 112 Ill. App. 2d 220, 250 N.E.2d 517 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Burke,
9 Ariz. App. 395, 452 P.2d 722 (1969); Decker v. Coleman, 6 N.C. App. 102,
169 S.E.2d 487 (1969).
12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. 307, 316 (1924), rev'd in
272 U.S. 365 (1926). The isolation and resulting "ghettoization" of minority
groups tend to multiply the discr'minatory practices perpetuated on them. Second-
rate municpal services, loss of voting power through gerrymandering, selective
police practices, corrupt merchants and inferior education are a few examples of
the effects of segregation. See Dubofsky, Far Housing: Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 165 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclu-
sionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
For a recent state court decision invalidating the method of financing the public
schools due to invidious discrimination, see Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601. 487
P.2d 1241 (1971), infra note 61. See also Peiler, Metropolitanization and Land-
Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attiude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971).
13. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, RESEARCH REPORTS Nos. 2 AND
6 prepared for the NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS IN
ZONING AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1968).
14. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CIny; H.R. Doc. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1968). A lot size requirement
of two acres has been held unconstitutional for being exclusionary in Appeal of
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). Communities must
deal with the problems of population growth and cannot refuse to confront future
development by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to
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to the type of residence to be placed on the lot will thwart construction
of low-income apartment buildings. 15 Prohibition against industry is an-
other device used to discourage low-income housing, for there are no
jobs for low-income or minority groups where industry is absent.' Can
local zoning ordinances which exclude federally assisted housing be justi-
fied as substantially related to public health, safety, morals and welfare in
view of the need for low-income housing?
If anything, local exclusionary zoning has an adverse effect on minority
groups by confining them to the congested urban areas. Shannon v. U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development'7 recognized the con-
gressional view as to the factors which caused urban blight and the possible
solutions. Among the considerations relevant to a proper determination
of low-income housing sites by HUD was the following:
Have the zoning and other land-use regulations of the local governing body in a
geographic area . . . had the effect of confining low-income housing to certain areas,
and, if so, how has this affected racial concentration?' 8
The court required HUD to act affirmatively to achieve fair housing be-
cause "increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie
likely to lead to urban blight and is thus prima facie at variance with the
national housing policy."' 19
near present levels. "We fully realize that the overall solution to these problems
lies with greater regional planning." Id. at 769. See also Kennedy Park Homes
Assoc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); National Land and
Investment Co. v. Easttown Twp. Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965). Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953).
15. See Haar, Zoning for Minium Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953). See also Molino v. Mayor and Council of Borough
of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971) in which the zoning ordi-
nance required such amenities as automatic garbage disposals, central air condi-
tioning, pools and tennis courts. The ordinance was held to be violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and an invalid use of the
zoning power to restrict the city's population to adults in an effort to avoid in.
creased tax burdens. Accord, DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corporation
No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
16. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 14.
17. Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d
809 (3d Cir. 1970).
18. Id. at 822. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local
Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV. 367 (1965) for statistical analysis of where most
people live and how fragmented local zoning is.
19. Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Developments, 436 F.2d 809,
821 (1970). See Note, 46 R.Y.U.L.R. 560 (1971). For discussion of racial con-
centration through site selection, see Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La.
1969), infra note 30, et seq.
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Discriminatory zoning practices need to be recognized and eliminated
along with other land-use regulations which result in racial and economic
discrimination. Three such land-use devices-building codes, site selec-
tion, and public referendum-have surfaced in recent cases. The next
sections will focus on each, revealing its effect on low-income housing
and the judiciary's response. The decisions will illustrate the need for
state and federal legislation authorizing regional land-use planning to su-
persede local land-use regulations which affect public housing.
BUILDING PERMITS
Coupling zoning ordinances with restrictive and archaic building codes
barricades a community from undesired construction and unwanted peo-
ple. Obsolete and excessively restrictive building codes grounded in
terms of health, safety and general welfare prevent the use of such modern
technology as off-site production and standardized design in the construc-
tion of buildings. 20 Building codes and zoning ordinances are supposedly
implemented to insure health and safety, control the burden on municipal
services, and promote the optimal use of the land. In many cases, they
reduce the supply of low-income families. The result is socio-economic
segregation paralleling racial discrimination. 21
In areas where the land is zoned to include multiple dwellings so as to
allow the possibility of low-income housing, any attempt to construct fed-
erally-assisted housing can be frustrated by a denial of a building permit.
In Crow v. Brown,22 two unincorporated tracts of land were zoned to per-
20. See Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 317 (1955). See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIvIc DISORDERS (1968) which said, "We can no longer afford the waste caused
by arbitrary and archaic building codes." Id. at 263.
21. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). A statute which is constitutional on its
face may, in the context of a given factual situation, be applied unfairly or for a
discriminatory purpose. Statutes such as this have long been held as violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See United States v.
Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); United States v. Scotland Neck City
Board of Education, 442 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1971); Wright v. City of Brighton,
441 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Geo. 1971), aff'd 457 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972). See Comment, Suburban Zoning Ordinances and Building Codes:
Their Effect, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 123 (1969).
The court in Crow found, with respect to public housing, a locality can no
more concentrate low-income blacks in ghetto areas than they can confine black
children to segregated schools. Discrimination in housing and education is both
racial and economic. The same solutions can be used in each. See Serrano v.
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mit construction of apartments based on the prior owner's intention to
build "nice" apartments, townhouses, and a shopping center. After pur-
chase of the land, the plaintiff complied with all building codes and plan-
ning requirements, but intended to participate in a "turnkey" project2'-
wherein completed apartments are sold to the local housing authority and
then leased to qualified low-income tenants. County officials denied the
requisite building permits despite approval from the Atlanta Housing Au-
thority, HUD and favorable zoning. Plaintiff claimed that the denial of
a building permit was based on racial reasons because the county officials
did not consider low-income apartments "nice." The court ruled that the
failure to issue the permit was a denial of equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment, a violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968
and a thwarting of the national policy of dispersed public housing. 24 More-
over, any activity or lack thereof tending to concentrate low-income
blacks was held to be invalid. 25  Admonishing the county officials, the
court said that "[h]aving already zoned these sites for apartments, it
should be obvious that the County may not restrict the class of Americans
to be housed therein."'12 6  The building permit was not allowed to prevent
construction of low-income housing in an area zoned for apartments.
The decision in Crow applies only to land that is already favorably
zoned for apartments, thus limiting its application in situations involving
unincorporated or restrictively zoned land. In Dailey v. City of Lawton,
Oklahoma,27 plaintiff applied for a zoning "change"; as amended, plaintiff
would be able to acquire a building permit which would allow construction
of low-income housing. Most of the land surrounding the proposed loca-
tion was zoned for high-density apartment use. Both the zoning petition
and building permit were denied after the townspeople circulated a peti-
tion which opposed the change. The court allowed mandatory injunctive
relief under the Civil Rights Act 2 s holding that the denial was racially
Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) and Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. For a good explanation of how turnkey projects are set up, see Comment
Turn Key Public Housing in Wisconsin, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 231.
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 801, 1983, 3601 (1970). See also Comment, The Equal
Protection Clause: A Single-edged Sword for the Gordian Knot of Exclusionary
Zoning, 40 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 24 (1971).
25. For cases on the affirmative duty of officials to end racial segregation, see
text accompanying supra note 17 and infra note 50.
26. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390 (1971).
27. Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969),
aff'd 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides that: "Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or
[Vol. XXII
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motivated, arbitrary and unreasonable. Moreover, if local officials are
effectuating a discriminatory design of private individuals, there need be
no proof of any open discriminatory statements by the officials them-
selves. 29  Crow and Dailey involved blatant discriminatory uses of build-
ing codes. More often, building codes operate indirectly to achieve ex-
clusionary results.
SITE SELECTION
Once some land-use regulations were revealed as potential instruments
to be used to segregate and isolate people according to income levels or
skin color, all land-use regulations and techniques came under scrutiny.
The United States Constitution denounces racial segregation; any conduct
by local officials which is little more than an excuse to avoid integration
is no longer permitted.
In Hicks v. Weaver,30 a preliminary injunction was issued against a
housing authority to prevent construction of public housing in an all
black area. HUD was enjoined3 from funding the project as the city's
policy was to maintain racial segregation through site selection. Although
not a per se violation of the Civil Rights Act, locating public housing in
all black areas was held to create a strong inference of discrimination.
The court put the burden on the city to show that no alternative sites
were available. If the dominant purpose of placing low-income housing
in all black areas is to maintain racial concentration and segregation,
then there is a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The city has a duty not
to discriminate in its selection of sites. However, is the duty imposed
merely the negative one not to discriminate intentionally or is the duty a
positive mandate that requires affirmative action to prevent discriminatory
results?
territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
29. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948). These two Supreme Court cases hold that a state cannot enforce a
provision which permits private individuals to discriminate.
30. Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). This section states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
32. See Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 205.1 (1967) in which HUD inter-
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An Arizona court33 answered this problem in a case where the plain-
tiffs contended that placement of a "turnkey" project in a predominantly
black area violated their constitutional rights. Where the result would
be perpetuation of isolation of racial and national groups, the Tucson
Housing Authority was held to have abused its discretion and was en-
joined. The court based its decision on three major criteria: (1) that
the area selected is the only black area in the community; (2) that the
Authority admittedly rejected considering the racial character of the
neighborhood; 34 and (3) that there is no evidence that any such project
has been placed in a white area. The court said:
The duty imposed under the statute and the regulations is not simply the negative
duty to not discriminate. It is a mandate that prohibits housing authorities from
acting in a manner that results in discrimination. 35
By reading the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution together with
federal laws, the court arrived at the conclusion that racial discrimination
in site selection "has become of sufficient import to warrant its specific
prohibition by regulation." 36
The courts, so far, are dealing successfully, and consistently with ex-
clusionary zoning practices, building codes, and site selection. The judi-
ciary is concluding that local control is not synonymous with local au-
tonomy. With each community legislating in its own provincial interests,
the metropolitan area becomes a checkerboard of conflicting land-use
regulations permitting beneficial uses and excluding undesirable ones.
The courts are attempting to require that each community share the bur-
den of uneconomic uses and provide low-income housing for minority
preted the Civil Rights Act as forbidding federally-financed housing in all black
areas unless there is no other site available.
For the national policy of balanced and dispersed public housing, see Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970),
a/I'd 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), enforced in
304 F. Supp. 736 (1970), a/I'd 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
922 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, Oklahoma, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla.
1969), a/I'd 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. La. 1969). See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING
THE AMERICAN CrIr, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1969); Com-
ment, Exclusionary Zoning: Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Act, 1971 L.
AND SOCIAL ORDER 538 (1971).
33. El Cortez Residents and Property Owner's Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Au-
thority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969). For a discussion of discrimina-
tion in site selection, see Note, 64 MICH. L. REv. 871 (1966); Note, 64 N.W. L. REV.
720 (1970); Note, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970); Note, 1970 WIsc. L. REV. 559.
34. The criteria used by the authority included availability of transportation,
local zoning, community services, traffic patterns and business locations.
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and low-income groups. However, there is confusion and disagreement
as to the approach the judiciary should take toward public referendums
on land-use policy.
REFERENDUMS
Due to the public policy of non-discrimination, the need for low-income
housing, the judiciary's current approach to exclusionary land-use devices
and a growing awareness of the problems of poverty, ordinances are be-
ing drafted to include low-income housing. In a reaction to this legisla-
tion, the public referendum is a tool the community can use to set the
pure democratic process of direct legislation to the task of invalidating
any laws directed at achieving dispersed, non-discriminatory, low-income
housing.37
35. El Cortez Residents and Property Owner's Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Au-
thority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 134, 457 P.2d 294, 296 (1969). Affirmative action on
the part of public officials has been expanded to include omission. See Norwalk
Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) where the
court said: "Equal protection of the laws means more than merely the absence of
governmental action designed to discriminate . . . 'we now firmly recognize that
the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair . . . as
the perversity of a willful scheme.'" Id. at 931. See also the dissent in English v.
Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1971) where Judge Oakes states:
"[Pilaintiffs made a significant preliminary showing of the town's long-standing
policy of passivity resulting in housing discrimination against minority groups, to
have justified a grant of some form of preliminary relief ....... Id. at 326.
36. El Cortez Residents and Property Owner's Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Au-
thority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 134, 457 P.2d 294, 296 (1969). The federal actions
which supported the state court's decisions are: Executive Order No. 11063 (1962)
which is a directive requiring non-discriminatory federal housing; Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(2)(i) (1969) which reads that "[A]
recipient (state or political subdivision), in determining the location or type of
housing . . . may not directly or through contractual or other agreements, utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting persons
to discrimination because of their race, color or national origin, or have the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
or activity as respect persons of a particular race, color, or national origin."
37. In Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969) zoning
allowed low-rent apartment construction. The community circulated a referendum
petition to deny zoning through a general election. The court could find no
federal law to support an injunction against the referendum. The referendum was
deemed to be founded on neutral principals, not discrimination. The referendum
being a legislative process of the state is held to be exempt from federal constitu-
tional restraints. "[I1f the electors had a legal right to a referendum, their motive
in exercising that right would be immaterial." Id. at 326. Compare with Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 in which the Court ruled on the referendum after
the election and then held that it did more than repeal existing law. The referen-
dum authorized discrimination in the housing market.
But see Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court held
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) not only applies to government housing policies but af-
19721
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Before dealing directly with zoning referendums, the constitutional
case, Shelley v. Kramer,38 can provide the necessary background to un-
derstand the complexity of the issues present when a public referendum
overrides a local zoning ordinance that permits low-income housing.
Generally, the issue presented in Shelley was whether the state courts
can enforce private restrictive covenants placed on land whose purpose
was the exclusion of minority groups from the ownership or occupancy
of that real property. It was decided that judicial enforcement of these
private agreements would deny certain minority groups equal protection
of the law. The private agreements themselves were not violative of the
fourteenth amendment. However, active intervention by the state courts
to enforce these private agreements would be unconstitutional state action
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 The
state was not merely abstaining from action, leaving private individuals
free to discriminate. The state was actively denying property rights on
the grounds of race or color. The court declared the restrictive cove-
nants unenforceable. 4°
More recently, petitioners in Reitman v. Mulkey41 were suing under
state statutes which prohibited discrimination 42 as they felt they were
denied the right to purchase housing on the basis of race. However,
through an initiated measure submitted to the public as Proposition 14, a
section was successfully added to the state constitution which provided
that the state would not deny or limit the right of any person to decline
fects private refusals to sell real property on discriminatory grounds. It was de-
termined that: "[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes
their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery." Id. at 442-43. Accord, Hurd v. Hodger, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
38. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For the historical evolution from restrictive covenants
to zone ordinances, see R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.04 (1968);
BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 141 (1954).
39. The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 which requires that: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, at 18-23 (1948).
41. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See Karst and Horowitz, Reit-
man v. Mulkey: A Telephase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. REV.
39.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 52 (1972).
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to sell real property to persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses. 48
The California Supreme Court was convinced that this state constitu-
tional provision overturned the state laws dealing with discrimination in
housing. The question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the state is taking a neutral position on private discrimination by
the presence of this amendment in their constitution. The Court as-
sessed that the ultimate impact of the provision "would encourage and
significantly involve the State in private racial discrimination contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 44 In declaring the initiated provision of the
people unconstitutional, Justice White, speaking for the majority, made
clear that:
[A] court [must] assess the potential impact of official action in determining
whether the State has significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations.
Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law
forbidding private racial discrimination. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and
does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. 45
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, compares Proposition 14 to the
restrictive covenant in Shelley as "only another device of the same char-
acter.
'4 6
However, in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City
of Union City, California47 (SASSO), plaintiffs sought an injunctive ac-
tion directing the city to follow the zoning changes permitting construction
of federally-financed housing for low-income and moderate-income fami-
lies in spite of a city-wide referendum overruling the rezoning ordinance.
The court felt racial motives were no more evident than environmental
ones and would not discuss the result of the referendum. By orienting
itself to the motives rather than the results of the referendum, the court
expounded:
43. CAL. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 26 (1969).
44. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 at 376 (1967). For other decisions
which invalidated state action in either authorizing or encouraging discrimination,
see infra note 45.
45. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967). For cases where signifi-
cant state involvement in private discrimination amounts to unconstitutional state
action, see Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Nixon
v. Conlon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1926); McCabe
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. Co., 235 U.S. 351 (1914).
46. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967). Justices Harlan, Black,
Clark and Stewart joined in a lengthy dissent.
47. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City,
California, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
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A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded
neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters-an ex-
ercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct legislation to over-ride
the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public interest.48
The fact that discrimination may have been the effect of the referendum
and that the city had failed to provide low-income housing was not
enough to require an injunction for affirmative action by the city. The
court was, however, aware of the relationship between the referendum
and a possible exclusionary zoning impact when it said that if "the result
of this zoning by referendum is discriminatory (in denying decent housing
for low-income residents) . . . a substantial constitutional question is
presented. ' '4 9 The court, however, did not reach this constitutional issue.
In Hunter v. Erickson,50 a city had adopted a fair housing ordinance.
Thereafter, the city charter was amended by popular vote. The new
amendment provided that any ordinance regulating real property transac-
tions on the basis of race, color, or national origin had to be subjected to
a public referendum. This mandatory referendum was found to place a
"special burden" 51 on racial minorities in their efforts to use the govern-
ing process to protect their rights. Justice White, again speaking for the
majority, rejected the appeal to allow the townspeople to particpate in de-
cisions in order that, in the area of race relations, the city move slowly
by saying:
[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more dif-
ficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give
any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size. 5 2
Both Reitman and Hunter invalidated state action which led to en-
couragement or enforcement of provisions that had the purpose or effect
of denying equal protection under the law. Referendums can not be
used to involve the state in discrimination by either overturning or adding
special requirements to existing laws. The Court has not, however, been
totally consistent in its examination of referendums.
48. Id. at 294. See Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
49. 14. at 295. The court recognized the affirmative responsibility by the
city to include the needs of the poor. The court said: "[I]t may well be, as a
matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning officials to see
that the city's plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low-
income families, who usually-if not always-are members of minority groups."
Id. at 295-96.
50. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
51. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
52. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969). Justices Harlan and Stewart
concurred with the decision while Justice Black dissented.
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James v. Valtierra53 is a case with similar facts to Hunter, but with a
different conclusion. The state adopted California Constitution Article
XXXIV which required a mandatory referendum by any community be-
fore low-rent housing could be built. The referendum specifically applied
to any low-rent housing rather than referring exclusively to a racial mi-
nority as in Hunter. The article was challenged on equal protection
grounds, but the court refused to extend Hunter, which voided a provision
referring to race, color, and natural origin, to include the provision in
James which referred only to low-rent housing. This difference lead the
court to view the referendum as a "devotion to democracy, not to bias,
discrimination, or prejudice. ' '54
A fact the court ignored was that blacks occupy a majority of low-
income housing units.55 By upholding an article to a state constitution
which defines not only low-income housing, but low-income people, the
Court has validated economic discrimination. Classification on the basis
of poverty has long been a suspect classification and such laws normally
require exacting judicial scrutiny. 56 Just below the surface of the James
referendum lurked economic discrimination denying a specific class of
people a decent home in a decent area. Justice Marshall, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented in James declaring:
It is far too late in the day to contend that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
only racial discrimination; and to me, singling out the poor to bear a burden not
placed on any other class or citizen tramples the values that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was designed to protect. 5 7
53. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See Lafcoe, The Public Housing
Referendum Case, Zoning and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384 (1971).
54. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
55. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT
HOME (1968); REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
56. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). See also Hagman, Urban Planning and Development-Race and
Poverty-Past, Present and Future, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 46; Michaelman, The Su-
preme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 19-23 (1969).
57. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971). For a discussion of land-
use regulation and the way they discriminate economically, see Cutler, Legality of
Zoning to Exclude the Poor: A Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 483 (1971); Note, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971); Note, 16 How.
L.J. 351 (1971); Note, 23 STAN. L. REV. 774 (1971); Note, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV.
507 (1964); Note, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
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James is a step in the wrong direction in dealing with referendums over-
turning the fair housing ordinances and in recognizing the depressing ef-
fect economic discrimination has on poor people. It has been suggested
that James be narrowly construed.'"8
ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION
At this point in American judicial history, it would not be presumptu-
ous to say that the right to decent housing should be a fundamental right
and should not be a function of wealth. There are numerous Supreme
Court decisions which correct economic discrimination in areas other than
housing. The Court has used the equal protection clause to strike down
a poll tax due to its discriminatory effect on a poor person's right to
vote;'" to require a state to provide free transcripts for appellate review
in felony cases when the defendants are indigent;" to strike down a
state-wide system for financing public schools by local property taxes as
an invidious discrimination against the poor."
Although the factual backgrounds in these cases are diverse, there is
a common goal being achieved-extension of the fourteenth amendment's
protection to the poor. These cases are at least analogous to exclusionary
land-use regulation cases and at most offer the convincing rationale for
legislation to end exclusionary land-use regulation.6"
58. In English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971), Judge
Oakes in his dissent would prefer to read James more narrowly as approving a
state wide referendum requirement for investment in low-rent public housing in a
state where other referenda are used on a variety of subjects ...Id. at 327, fn. 5.
See Williams and Wachs, Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines:
Uonshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827 discussing Lionshead Lake,
Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), app. denied,
344 U.S. 919 (1953).
59. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
60. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This right was recently expanded
to include misdemeanors in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
61. Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). The court
said ". . . the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental interest
which cannot be conditioned on wealth...." Id. at 1244. See San Francisco Uni-
fied School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669 (1971).
62. Another fundamental right which could be used by analogy to declare ex-
clusionary land-use devices illegal is the right to travel. The Court knocked down
the state one year residency requirement for receipt of welfare assistance and
stated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969): "An indigent who
desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, start a new life will doubtless hesitate if
he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back
on state welfare assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may
be most acute. But the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the




There is ample rationale available to support the proposition that local
governmental units' control over land-use regulation affecting low-income
housing should be superseded by state and federal legislation to provide
federally-assisted public housing in all communities.63  The cases dis-
cussed in this comment point out the discriminatory practices designed to
maintain racial and economic segregation and isolation. The case-by-case
approach to combat local control devices is at best piece-meal and at
worst a failure. A more direct approach, and one being used in some
states and considered by others, is the use of the power of preemption.
Preemption by a state of a municipality's power is not a novel or new
concept. 64 In an area such as zoning, municipalities generally receive
their power to zone from a state enabling act."5 Basically, the theory is
"what the state giveth, the state taketh away." When the state and muni-
cipality are both legislating in the same field inconsistencies overlap and
conflicts will arise. The state law is supreme and it is a settled doc-
trine that:
[T]he enactment by the state of legislation constituting a comprehensive and de-
tailed general plan or scheme with respect to a subject shows, without more, an in-
tent to occupy the field, leaving no room for local regulation, regardless of whether
there is an express declaration to that effect by the Legislature. 6 6
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (Land-use regulation which excludes low-income
families from an area also inhibits interstate movement); Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (right to buy, sell and lease real property in any state);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right not to be excluded from any
state); Cofield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. D.C. (3d Cir. 1823) (right to establish resi-
dency in any state). See also Ellis, Shapiro, Dandridge, and Residency Require-
ments in Public Housing, 1972 URBAN L, ANN. 131.
63. For a good discussion on local government's potential to thwart the ap-
propriate distribution of governmental power to achieve or protect basic com-
munity values within the state, see Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power
Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
64. See generally R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 3.01-3.07
(1968); S. SATO AND A. ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERMENT LAWS (1970).
See also 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 99 (1911); FORDHAM, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 43 (1949); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 10.11 (1965).
65. See Comment, Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1971); Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Govern-
mental Land-Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316 (1961); Comment, The lnapplicalility of
Municipal Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land-Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV.
698 (1968); Comment, Conflicts Between State and Local Enactments, 2 URBAN
LAWS 398 (1970).
66. In re Carol Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
See ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 36(h). "[T]he General Assembly may p ovide s-e-
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The federal government has also refused to be hamstrung by a state
or local community's refusal to zone for a desired use or to permit a fed-
eral project. In City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,6 7 the city had a
license from the Federal Power Commission authorizing the construction
of dams. The state legislature had enacted a law to protect the fish life
and prevent the type of construction contemplated under the federal li-
cense. The people in the area and throughout the state promoted Initia-
tive No. 25 which prohibited the proposed construction, even if under a
federal license. The state court, in review of the Supreme Court's de-
cision on the same facts,68 held that state law can neither prevent the
Federal Power Commission from issuing the license nor bar the city from
acting under the license. The court explained:
The United States has exclusive and paramount jurisdiction over navigable waters
under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and, therefore, any
State laws are inapplicable . . .insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of
the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of the appellants' license for said
project, or which would enable the State . . .or any State official thereof to exercise
a veto over said project. ..69
The rationale is that Congress has the Constitutional power to enact the
Federal Power Act and having enacted it, intended the Federal Power
Commission to supersede state laws purporting to prohibit or limit the
purpose of the Act. The Supremacy Clause has displaced the state law
in that area.70
It is entirely possible that federal law in the form of civil rights and
fair housing acts has already pre-empted state law in the field of place-
ment of public low-income housing.7 Local exclusionary land-use regu-
cifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of
a home rule unit ....
67. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 66, 371 P.2d 938
(1962).
68. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958).
69. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 66, 371 P.2d 938
(1962).
70. See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297
(1961). See also Perez Y. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941). Seegenerally G. GUNTHER AND N. DOWLING, CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 670 (8th ed. 1970).
71. SeeHousing and Urban Development Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1720 (1969); Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1968); The Fair Housing
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3532 et seq. (1968); Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1445 (1966); Housing Act
of 1964, 12 U.S.C. § 1703 et seq.. (1964).
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lation interferes with national policy objectives. One or the other will
prevail. The case against local control is that land-use regulation is used
to discriminate against low-income groups and minorities by effectuating
resegregation and isolation and prohibiting construction of federally-as-
sisted housing in the suburban communities. The case for pre-emption is
that regional land use and control will optimize the utilization of land re-
sources and insure equal protection and due process in the placement of
low-income housing in all communities.
A solution has suggested itself in the form of present and pending
state legislation establishing state-wide and regional planning boards.
The purpose of this legislation is to promote regional land control and use.
The premise is that comprehensive plans encompassing large geographical
areas will facilitate better use of land resources.72  State and regional
planning boards will have supervisory and reviewing power over local
decisions to promote state-wide interests, thereby encouraging and en-
hancing intergovernmental cooperation. The by-product of this type
of legislation is that local communities lose control over the uses to which
their land is subject. Regulations standing in the way of regional popula-
tion expansion or excluding needed types of construction will be inval-
idated. Low-income families seeking homes will not have to deal ex-
clusively with local preferences on land use.
The fundamental concept behind these regional land-use laws is to re-
quire every community to be aware of and provide for the needs of all
people regardless of race or income level.7 3  If each community knew
that all others must provide low-income housing, attitudes and behavior
might change. Only through national legislation does this seem possible. 74
72. See Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land
Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan
and New Jersey: A Comparative Study, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1171 (1965); Boston
Study Team, Bureau of Public Affairs, Boston College, Metropolitan Boston-A
Fresh Approach, 3 PORTIA L.J. 131 (1968); Comment, Comprehensive Plan as
Limitation on Board of Adjustment, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 499 (1971); Comment, Re-
gional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washington Zoning Law, 45 WASH. L. REV.
593 (1970).
73. See Lordham, Some Questions and No Answers About Urban Regionalism,
1971 UTAH L. REV. 11; Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Plan-
ning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957); Comment, Are Zoning Boards Required by
the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs, 3 CONN. L. REV. 244 (1971); Note,
Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 600 (1965).
74. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
263 (1968). The report concluded: "The key to breaking down housing discrimi-
nation is universal and uniform coverage and such coverage is obtainable only
through Federal legislation."
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STATE LEGISLATION
State and federal legislation can benefit housing programs through land
write-downs, tax abatement, technical assistance, money loans, grants and
financing. 75 Many states have established state agencies with housing
responsibilities but so far most have been ineffectual. A few states have
begun to develop laws whereby local zoning ordinances forbidding low-
income housing can be reviewed by a state agency.7"
In New York, the Urban Development Corporation77 can reverse local
zoning decisions which reject a site that is appropriate for low-income
housing. New Jersey gives an injunctive remedy to any "other interested
party"7 8 when land is used in violation of the state code. "Other inter-
ested party"7 9 is defined to include people in and out of the community
who are affected by the use or whose constitutional rights are denied.
Hawaii has established a Land Use Commission. 0 Any property owner
may petition for a change of use of the land, if adaptable for the proposed
use and trends in development and conditions have changed so as to make
the present zoning unreasonable.
Every state should require municipalities to draft plans to include the
possibility of low-income housing and develop realistic procedures
whereby direct administrative appeals can be made. Massachusetts has
added to its state laws a low and moderate income housing section. 8 '
Local zoning boards must now consider the impact their decisions have
75. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAW AND POVERTY, I HANDBOOK ON
HOUSING LAW, Guide to Federal Housing Redevelopment and Planning Programs
(1970). Subsequent editions of the Handbook will deal directly with restrictive
zoning and other de facto segregation techniques.
76. See Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465 (1971);
Comment, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 246 (1970); Comment, New Jersey Judiciary's Response to Exclusionary
Zoning, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 172 (1970).
77. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6251-85 (McKinney, 1968); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 239-m (McKinney Supp. 1970).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55-30 to 51 (Supp. 1971). Under this statute, the
New Jersey Superior Court recently held, in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971), that when a township
ordinance aims at excluding low-income families through restrictions on mini-
mum floors and minimum lot sizes, it is invalid under the New Jersey Zoning Act.
The court felt that general welfare means regional general welfare. See Note, New
Jersey Judiciary's Response to Exclusionary Zoning, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 172 (1970).
79. N.J. REFORM CODE ANN. §§ 55-47 (1970).
80. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-15 (Supp. 1971), as amended, §§ 205-1
to 205-37 (Supp. 1971).
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1970).
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on regional and state needs for low-income housing. Local requirements
and regulations will be considered by the state "consistent with local needs
if they are reasonable in view of the regional need for low and moderate
income housing."'8 2 Further, such requirements and regulations must be
applied equally to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing. The com-
munity is required to permit a specific percent of public housing units on
a specific percentage of the total land. The state law thus insures that
local officials include low-income housing in the area unless there is an
adequate supply and any refusal can be appealed. There is even the op-
tion of submitting an application for construction of low-income housing
directly to the appeals board in lieu of applications to the local zoning
boards. 83 This type of legislation allows the state to supervise the activi-
ties of local zoning boards, to facilitate low-income housing construction
starts, and from a regional viewpoint, to control and regulate population
expansion. Local boards retain most of their discretion, but lose their
ability to be overly protective. The Massachusetts, New York, New Jer-
sey, and Hawaii state legislatures have realized that "the overall solution
to these [zoning] problems lies with greater regional planning. '84
The legislature of Illinois has introduced legislation to study, amend,
or replace present land-use regulations in order to end inadequate or in-
appropriate uses of land resources. A Planning and Conservation Laws
Study Commission 85 is sought to examine existing problems, statutes, and
judicial decisions of Illnois concerning "the planning, use and conservation
of the land resources of the State and its subdivisions." 6 The study will
use voluntarily submitted data to investigate specific environmental, so-
cial and governmental activities that may need technical assistance and
compile a file on persons with expertise in the area.
The Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs is directed in
another bill to establish a Division of Land Use Regulation, ' and a State
Land Use Commission. The Division of Land Use Regulation is given
standing to review and make written comments to governing bodies upon
any original ordinance or comprehensive amendatory ordinance. The
Division shall be given notice of any public housing concerning ordinances
82. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B § 20 (Supp. 1970).
83. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B § 21 (Supp. 1970).
84. Douglas Report, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1968).
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS RESEARcH REPORT, PROBLEMS OF
ZONING AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1968).
85. H.B. 1807, 77th G.A. (1971).
86. H.B. 1807, 77th G.A. (1971) at § 2.
87. H.B. 1808, 77th G.A. (1971).
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affecting, among other things, governmentally supported or insured hous-
ing. This Division, through its participation at local hearings and its
comprehensive plans and suggestions, will act as a central coordinate
point for state and local action.8 8 The desire of the state is apparent:
more participation by the state in local decision on land use. The optimal
use of the land is no longer a local issue.
There is a proposed addition to the Illinois Municipal Code. 89 Upon the
finding by a circuit court that a zoning ordinance prevents or isolates low-
income housing, the municipality will be directed to permit construction of
low and moderate income housing. The section in its entirety is as fol-
lows:
No municipality may exercise the powers granted in this Division 13 to prevent the
construction of single family or multifamily low-income housing in that municipal-
ity or to cause such housing to be isolated from other residential areas. If the cir-
cuit court finds that the exercise of those powers by any municipality operates to
produce such an effect, the court shall direct the corporate authorities of that mu-
nicipality to permit the construction, in any residential zone, of any housing which
is designed to meet the requirements of the Federal Housing Administration's "Min-
imum Property Standards for Multi-family Housing" or "Minimum Property Stand-
ards for One and Two Living Units", whichever is appropriate, including the revi-
sions thereto in effect on January 1, 1971.90
Obviously, the section is designed to deal with the effect of a zoning ordi-
nance, not merely the motives or intent. The section also incorporates,
by reference, federal standards for low-income housing. True freedom
of choice in housing will be available to low-income families only when
there is an adequate supply of low-income housing in areas outside the
racially concentrated central cities.
It is not within the scope of this comment to draft a model state land-
use code. 91 However, certain types of provisions which should be in-
cluded in any state zoning code will be mentioned. As immediate pre-
emption by the state of local regulations affecting public housing may not
be viewed as a viable solution, these provisions can be initiated as a com-
promise between local and state control. The provisions discussed are
found in the Illinois Land Resources Zoning Code. 92
88. See H.B. 1806, 77th G.A. (1971) in which an Intergovernmental Cooper-
ations Act is proposed to provide for joint exercise of powers by state agencies and
local governments to coordinate geographic, economic and population factors.
89. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24 (1971).
90. H.B. 1193, 77th G.A. (1971) (emphasis added). See H.B. 1191 and H.B.
1192 for similar additions to township and county zoning acts.
91. See Comment, Model Land Use and Development Code, 1971 URaAN L.
ANN. 101; Note, 36 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1971).
92. H.B. 1805, 77th G.A. (1971).
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COMMENT
The most interesting aspect of the Code is its shift in emphasis.. In the
proposed declaration of policy and purpose, the Code recognizes land -as!
the fundamental natural resource, the use and development of which shall
be controlled to promote existing and future public interests. These in-
terests are the social, economic and environmental needs of its subdivisions.
Gone is the language protecting the public health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare. In the past this phraseology was used to justify too broad a
range of restrictions. The new language promotes more specific goals at
the state level. A comprehensive zoning plan is mandatory so that muni-
cipal ordinances or amendments are consistent with the goals, objectives,
proposals and standards contained in the Code.
To further implement the desire for the optimal use of land, the Code
requires a mandatory review by local units of the classification of uses
and districting of all the land within their jurisdiction. Presently neither
comprehensive zoning plans nor periodic review are required. Without
such requirements land use planning would be meaningless as planning
would be shortsighted and once a plan was initiated it would continue in-
definitely whether beneficial to the public or not.
The provision allowing for application for amendments is not broad
enough to insure standing by nonresident minority groups or low-income
families. Applications for zoning amendments can only -be made by a
public official or persons residing or owning property within the jurisdic-
tion. The provision should, however, provide' standing for persons who
live outside the area whose rights are affected by the local zoning ordi-
nance because they are employed within the jurisdiction. Standing is ex-
tended to any person not a party to the application if he can show special
or unique damages to himself or his property. The type and extent of
damages required is not set out. This burden of proof, nevertheless,
would be onerous on a private individual or family denied a decent place
to live or work.
The standards for planned unit developments require that zoning ordi-
nances provide reasonable criteria to evaluate the proposal. The criteria
can neither unreasonably restrict the owner's ability to relate the plan to
the site nor ignore the particular demand for housing existing at the time
of development. The owner would not be faced with local restrictive
construction standards preventing low-income housing. National con-
struction standards would govern all building. If there were a marked
shortage in a specific type of housing, this need would be recognized.
Normally, an action taken by a governmental unit is presumed valid
and will remain in effect until proven otherwise.. The Code carves out
19721
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an expressed exception to this rule. The action shall be presumed valid
except
when such action results in a denial of housing opportunity to persons employed
within the jurisdiction and when there is a demonstrable need for such housing
within the jurisdiction such presumption shall not arise.9 3
The focus is on the results of local action. It should also be noted that
this section is not limited to persons residing or owning property in the
area. The purpose of the section is to provide housing for all persons
who work in the area regardless of where they presently live.
Among the standards required for judicial review, the court must con-
sider, among others, the following factors before rendering a decision:
(I) The need in the area and surrounding region for a particular land
use, (2) the public benefits compared to the limitations imposed on the
owner by the ordinance, and (3) the effect existing and proposed ordi-
nances will have on the patterns of racial, ethnic, or economic segrega-
tion of residences in the area. Of course, the courts have yet to deter-
mine what are the low-income housing needs, what is the extent that pub-
lic benefits outweigh private ones, or what is the precise effect ordinances
have on racial and economic segregation. The Code, however, requires
that the court be cognizant of them.
This is hardly an exhaustive list of possible provisions that could en-
hance the opportunity for public housing to be placed in areas where it is
most needed. It is a good legislative start in providing low-income hous-
ing for minorities and families with low incomes. It may be disheartening
for citizens to watch the state take over the control of land since local
control and home rule are basic concepts in the American way of life.94
However, when individual communities fail to respond to the needs of
the general public, solutions will be forthcoming elsewhere. In this
case, states are beginning to adopt regional land-use laws.9 What may
be even more disheartening to local governments is that the federal gov-
ernment is considering similar legislation.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The Federal government is quickly rationalizing the implementation of
land-use controls. In the name of ecology, this legislation will usurp the
93. H.B. 1807, §§ 10-102, 77th G.A. (1971).
94. Illinois' new state constitution includes a new home rule article. See ILL.
CONST. art. 7.
95. See text supra note 77, et seq.
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power heretofore vested in the local municipalities. Local control has
failed to deal with land-use problems of more than local significance.
The proposed National Land Policy, Planning, and Management Act
of 197296 finds an urgent need for federal public land-use planning and
land-use planning for land in non-federal ownership. The planning is to
occur at the federal level because the present state and local institutional
arrangements for planning land use of more than local impact are often
inadequate. While there is a national interest in encouraging states to
control non-federal lands, the states will be assisted, in cooperation with
local governments, in dealing with land-use decisions of more than local
significance.
The federal government will make grants to states that have adopted a
comprehensive land-use plan. This plan must follow the national policy
and insure that local regulations do not restrict or exclude regional de-
velopment. The overriding purpose of this act is to establish long-term
public land policies to give direction to the federal land management
agencies and to assist the states in land-use planning. The federal gov-
ernment is aware of the factors which cause fragmented land-use schemes.
Its efforts in the future will be directed toward coordinating land regula-
tion to achieve national priorities.
In another proposed piece of land-use regulation, the Land Use Policy
and Planning Assistance Act of 1972,11 Congress spells out the problems
and suggests solutions in regulating land resources. The Act declares that
it is the national policy to favor patterns of land-use planning, manage-
ment and development which are in accord with social values and to en-
courage the balanced use of the Nation's land resources. This policy in-
cludes financial assistance to states to develop land-use programs for non-
federal land and increase cooperation in the administration and manage-
ment of federal lands.
CONCLUSION
While state and federal legislation has not yet specifically pre-empted
local power to exclude low-income housing, its trend is in that direction.
96. H.R. 7211, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1972). See Marcus, Exclusionary
Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970);
Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional
Needs? 3 CONN. L. REV. 244 (1971); Weinberg, Regional Land-Use Control: Pre-
requisite for Rational Planning, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 786 (1971); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning from a Regional Perspective, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 239; Note, State
Police Power-Zoning-Validity of Local Ordinance Depends on Considerations of
Regional, Not Merely Local, General Welfare, 25 VAND. L. REv. 466 (1972).
97. S. 632, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
1.9721 COMMENT
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Supervision and review by state and federal agencies are the intermediate
steps to out-right control. While many land-use regulations are still pro-
prietary in that they concern purely local matters, the placement ana
construction of low-income housing has regional and national impact.
Zoning out low-income housing is like zoning out schools, churches,
hospitals, medical facilities and state institutions." Exclusionary land-use
regulations will not stand in the way of a use affected with a public in-
terest. 99
The course for communities to follow is to terminate the use of their
powers to zone and control land-use to hinder the opportunities and con-
stitutional rights of low-income families seeking housing in the area. It is
better from a home rule standpoint to permit low-income housing at a
reasonable rate, thereby retaining control over land-use and, at the same
time, furthering state and national fair housing policies. Otherwise, the
stage is set for state and federal control of land-use in placing and con-
structing low-income housing.
William Groebe
98. When local regulations affect regional needs and interests, they will be in-
validated. There is clear precedent to give certain types of uses special considera-
tion. Low-income housing may soon be among those preferred uses. See Sisters
of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 342, 154 N.W.2d
644 (1967) (hospital); Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-
Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 220 A.2d 97 (1966) (school); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Bd. of Town of Blighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956) (churches);
Rogers v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 308 N.Y. 126, 123
N.E.2d 806 (1954) (semi-residential public service). See also, Thanet Corp. v.
Board of Adjustment, 104 N.J. Super. 180, 249 A.2d 31 (1969); Ouffcon Concrete
Products v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
99. See West v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30
(1954); City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist., 254 Iowa 900,
119 N.W.2d 909 (1963); Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority, 348 Mass. 107, 202 N.E.2d 602 (1964); Nehrbas v. Inc. Village of Lloyd
Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241 (1957). See also 8 MCQUILLAN, MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS § 2515 (3rd ed. rev. 1965); Michelman, The Advent o1 a Right
to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS REV. 307 (1970); Note, 31
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 525 (1962).
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